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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING  
 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) U.R.A.P., the following is a complete list of the parties 
present to this appeal: (1) Gold’s Gym International, Inc.; and (2) Clark Statham and 
Brent Chamberlain. The other entities or individuals that were parties to this action but 
that are not parties to this appeal are: (1) Vince Engle; (2) Travis Izatt; (3) Health Source, 
Inc.; (4) Fitcorp, Inc.; (5) Fitness Source, LLC; (6) OPM Holdings, Inc.; and (7) St. 
George Fitness, LLC.       
INTRODUCTION 
 
This appeal seeks attorneys’ fees from the Members of a closely-held corporation 
who unsuccessfully asserted claims on behalf of their company based on rights embodied 
in a contract that provides for attorneys’ fees. Brent Statham and Clark Chamberlain (the 
“Members”) were members of Health Source of St. George, LLC (“HSSG”). The 
Members filed a lawsuit against Gold’s Gym and other defendants seeking to enforce a 
franchise License Agreement. The parties to the License Agreements were only HSSG 
and Gold’s Gym. The Members brought five (5) causes of action, all of which were 
intricately and directly related to the claim for breach of the License Agreement: (1) 
conversion of the franchise rights embodied in the License Agreement between Gold’s 
Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s Gym”) and HSSG; (2) tortious interference with the 
prospective contract rights between HSSG and its clients; (3) civil conspiracy to sell the 
franchise rights in the Franchise Agreement; (4) negligence arising from failure to fulfill 
contractual duties under the License Agreements; and (5) breach of the License 
Agreement.  
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The negligence and breach of contract claims were dismissed on Gold’s Gym’s 
Motion to Dismiss because they were barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. After 
a three-day bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Gold’s Gym on all of the 
remaining claims. Despite containing a “prevailing party” attorneys’ fee provision, the 
trial court found that Gold’s Gym was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the License 
Agreement because the Members were not parties thereto even though all of the 
Members’ claims directly arose therefrom.  
Members should not be allowed to enforce rights under a contract but escape its 
obligations. Gold’s Gym additionally seeks a determination from the Supreme Court of 
Utah regarding the exception to the derivative action rule regarding closely-held 
corporations. In particular, Gold’s Gym seeks a ruling that members of a closely-held 
LLC should be held individually liable for attorneys’ fees for asserting rights embodied 
in a contract to which only the corporation is a party and that contains an attorneys’ fees 
provision.       
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
I. Is the action brought by the Members a derivative action on behalf of 
HSSG which would require the Members to pay Gold’s Gym’s attorneys’ fees and costs?  
(a) “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for 
correctness....” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 11, 245 
P.3d 184, 189 (citations omitted).  
(b) For support that this issue was preserved in the trial court, refer to (i) 
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Reply Memorandum in Support 
thereof filed with the trial court on 9 January 2017 and 24 March 2017, respectively, (ii) 
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Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support 
thereof filed on 26 February 2013 and 4 June 2013, respectively, and (iii) the transcripts 
from the three-day bench trial that occurred on 1-3 November 2016.  
II. Did the trial court err by failing to award Gold’s Gym attorneys’ fees and 
costs under the attorneys’ fee provision in the License Agreement?  
(a) “Questions of contract interpretation which are confined to the language of 
the contract itself are questions of law, which we review for correctness.” Mellor v. 
Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, ¶ 7, 201 P.3d 1004, 1007. 
(b) For support that this issue was preserved in the trial court, refer to (i) 
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Reply Memorandum in Support 
thereof filed with the trial court on 9 January 2017 and 24 March 2017, respectively, (ii) 
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support 
thereof filed on 26 February 2013 and 4 June 2013, respectively, and (iii) the transcripts 
from the three-day bench trial that occurred on 1-3 November 2016.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Facts of the Case. On 22 June 1999, Gold’s Gym International, Inc. 
(“Gold’s Gym”), a national fitness franchisor, entered into a License Agreement with 
Health Source of St. George, Inc. (“HSSG”) to operate a Gold’s Gym located in St. 
George, Utah. (Exhibit A of Addendum; Record on Appeal (“R.”), pp. 632-653). HSSG 
is a closely-held corporation owned 50% by Brent Statham and Clark Chamberlain (the 
“Members” of the corporation that brought this lawsuit), with the remaining 50% owned 
by Vince Engle (“Mr. Engle”) through his personal company known as Health Source, 
Inc. (“HSI”). (R., pp.669-687).  
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On 10 April 2001, Defendant Engle represented to Gold’s Gym that Statham and 
Chamberlain were no longer involved with HSSG. In reliance on this representation, 
Gold’s Gym entered into a franchise agreement with HSI. Subsequently, on 8 May 2003, 
Gold’s Gym received a Consent to Assignment authorizing the transfer of the Gym, 
which was signed by Mr. Engle. (R., pp.2423-2432). Later in 2005, the Plaintiffs 
contacted Gold’s Gym after they learned of the transfer. They claimed Gold’s Gym had 
improperly transferred the license interest.    
B. The Procedural History. On 11 July 2005, the Members of HSSG filed suit 
against Mr. Engle, Gold’s Gym, and other defendants.1 Despite HSSG never being named 
a party to this action, the Members filed suit on behalf of the corporation against Gold’s 
Gym for: (1) breach of the License Agreement; (2) negligence; (3) tortious interference 
with prospective contract rights; (4) conversion of contractual rights; and (5) conspiracy 
to convert contractual rights.2  
On 27 October 2011, Judge Toomey granted Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss 
with respect to the Members’ negligence and breach of contract claims. (R., pp.275-280). 
The court concluded that the negligence and breach of contract claims were new causes 
of action that “did not relate back to the earlier Complaint as provided by Rule 15(c), and 
the statute of limitations has run.” (Id.). 
                                                 
1 The original case was dismissed without prejudice on 19 November 2008 for failure to 
prosecute. The instant case was filed on 18 November 2009. 
2 Mr. Engle was also a named Defendant in this action, against whom the court entered a 
Default Judgment. On 7 February 2017, the trial court entered a Default Judgment against 
Mr. Engle and his personally-owned companies Fitcorp and HSSG. The amount of the 
Default Judgment was for $7,165,032.21 in consequential damages, $3,762,632.21 in 
prejudgment interest, $20,000,000 in punitive damages, and post-judgment interest at the 
statutory rate of 2.87%. (R., pp.430-431).   
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During the discovery of this matter, Gold’s Gym prevailed on all but one of the 
discovery-related motions filed either by the Members or Gold’s Gym. Subsequently, 
Gold’s Gym filed two motions for summary judgment, both of which were denied. 
However, after a three-day bench trial, the trial court agreed with Gold’s Gym’s 
arguments – the same arguments presented in its motions for summary judgment – and 
entered a judgment dismissing all claims against Gold’s Gym on all of the Members’ 
claims against Gold’s Gym. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court.  
Motion for Summary Judgment Ruling: Gold’s Gym filed a Summary Judgment 
Motion to dismiss the Members’ claims because Gold’s Gym argued their claims were 
derivative on behalf of HSSG. In her ruling, inter alia, the Honorable Kate A. Toomey 
held that Plaintiffs could proceed due to the closely held corporation exception to the 
derivative action rules. (R., pp.1427-1449). 
Bench Trial Results: After the three-day bench trial, the trial court found for 
Gold’s Gym on all claims. (R., pp.3631-3665). On 9 January 2017, Gold’s Gym filed a 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (R., pp.3817-3869). On 29 March 2017, the 
Honorable Todd Shaughnessy in the Third Judicial District denied Gold’s Gym’s 
respective motion in the form of a minute entry and without conducting any oral 
arguments on the motion. (R., pp.4340-4341). On 4 April 2017, Gold’s Gym, filed this 
Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R., pp.4344-4346).3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
                                                 
3 On 21 February 2017, the Members filed a Notice of Appeal but then subsequently 
withdrew their appeal on 30 October 2017. (R., pp.4038-4039).  
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The Members of HSSG brought a derivative action on behalf of the closely-held 
LLC against Gold’s Gym. HSSG is a party to the License Agreement; the Members were 
not in privity of contract with Gold’s Gym. The Members have no direct injury. Thus, the 
Members’ claims against Gold’s Gym could only be derivative claims. The trial court 
allowed the claims to proceed despite the fact that the Members had no contractual 
privity or individual interest – citing the closely-held corporation exception to the 
derivative action rules that would otherwise bar the Members from asserting such claims. 
The Members should be required to assume the obligations under the License Agreement 
where they have asserted rights thereunder, including the obligation to pay attorneys’ 
fees.  
ARGUMENTS  
A. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to An Award of Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to the 
Broadly-Worded Attorneys’ Fee Provision In the License Agreement. The Members 
did not contest at trial that the License Agreement contains a broadly-worded attorneys’ 
fee provision. In Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d 825, 
829-30, the Utah Court of Appeals held that “[certain] attorney fees provisions at issue 
are not limited to litigation arising from the contract claims.” “Rather, they are broadly 
worded and allow an award of such fees to the “prevailing party” in “any legal action 
aris[ing] under ... or relating to” the … agreement.” Id. at 830-831 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). “Under this broad contractual language, attorney fee awards are not 
limited to the specific claims a party prevails upon but instead may be awarded to the 
party who prevails in an action that arises out of or relates to the agreements.” Id. at 
831 (emphasis added); see e.g., Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT 
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13, ¶¶ 11, 45, 325 P.3d 70 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim fell within the 
scope of a contract’s forum selection clause).  
In this case, the relevant section of the License Agreement provides: 
4.  Costs and Attorneys’ Fees: The prevailing party in any dispute 
relating to or arising out of this Agreement, shall be entitled to recover its 
costs and expenses including, without limitation, accounting’, attorneys’, 
arbitrators’, and related fees, costs, and other expenses, in addition to any 
other relief to which such party may be entitled. (Ex. A to Addendum, § 4, 
p.16) (emphasis added). 
 
This attorneys’ fee provision awards attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party for “any 
dispute” that is “relating to or arising out of” the License Agreement. Therefore, the 
Court should grant Gold’s Gym an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the broad, 
mandatory contractual language contained in the License Agreement, and particularly 
because this was not contested below. 
B. Gold’s Gym Is the Prevailing Party On All of the Members’ Claims. The 
Members did not contest in the trial court that Gold’s Gym was the prevailing party on all 
claims. “Generally, only the prevailing or successful party is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees.” Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, ¶¶ 6-7, 246 P.3d 521, 522–23 (citations 
omitted). From the very outset of the case, Gold’s Gym successfully dismissed with 
prejudice the Members’ claims for: (1) breach of contract; and (2) negligence. Then, 
Gold’s Gym prevailed on each of the Members’ three causes of action tried to the bench: 
(1) intentional interference; (2) conversion; and (3) conspiracy. Gold’s Gym provided a 
successful defense to all of the Members’ claims asserted against it.  
C. Gold’s Gym Is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees and Costs On the Members’ 
Breach of Contract Claim. The trial court granted Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss the 
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Members’ breach of contract claim. (R., pp.275-280; 27 October 2011 Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p.5). The breach of contract claim was a new cause of action that 
“did not relate back to the earlier Complaint as provided by Rule 15(c), and the statute of 
limitations has run.” (Id.) The Members’ contract claim arose out of and related to the 
License Agreement because the Members alleged that Gold’s Gym breached that 
Agreement. Gold’s Gym was the “prevailing party” on the Members’ contract claim.     
After analyzing the Members’ Complaint, Gold’s Gym determined to file a 
Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.174-183). Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss and the Reply 
Memorandum in Support thereof consisted of approximately 10 pages. The Members 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition thereto and a Sur-reply Memorandum that contained 
roughly 15 pages. Preparation and attendance was required for the respective hearing 
held before the trial court. In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $13,676.42 in attorneys’ fees 
and costs with respect to the Motion to Dismiss. (R., 3870-3960; Declaration (“Decl.”) of 
Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 21). Therefore, Gold’s Gym seeks the above-stated amount as part of 
its award for reasonable attorneys’ fees in prevailing in the Members’ contract claim. 
D. The Members’ Intentional Interference, Conversion, and Conspiracy 
Claims “Arise Out Of” and “Relate To” the License Agreement. The Members did 
not dispute at the trial court that their intentional interference, conversion, and conspiracy 
claims arose out of and related to the License Agreement.   
1. Intentional Interference With Contract. The Members based their tortious 
interference claim in part, on intentional breach of contract. The trial court made the 
following findings: 
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Insofar as the Members are asserting that Gold’s Gym interfered with the 
License Agreement, or with a prospective Franchise Agreement, that 
claim fails because Gold’s Gym was (or would have been) a party to those 
contracts and the Members cannot sue Gold’s Gym for interfering with a 
contract to which it is a party. (R., pp.3631-3665; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p.29) (emphasis added). 
… 
Although the Members could potentially rely on their conversion claim as 
the improper means to support a claim against St. George Fitness (a claim 
that fails for the reasons identified above), they cannot show improper 
means by Gold’s Gym. At most, Gold’s Gym breached a contract with the 
Members (or the entity they now claim to control). A breach of contract 
cannot serve as improper means, unless, perhaps, there is proof that it 
was done intentionally and for the purpose of inflicting economic harm, 
which the Members have not shown in this case. “A deliberate breach of 
contract, even where employed to secure economic advantage, is not, by 
itself, an ‘improper means.’” (Id., pp.30-31) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  
 
A breach of the License Agreement was integral to the “improper means” element 
of the Members’ intentional interference claim. Gold’s Gym was forced to defend a 
breach of contract claim all the way through trial (even though the breach of contract 
claim was dismissed with prejudice on Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss) because an 
intentional breach of the License Agreement with the purpose to inflict economic harm 
can serve as a basis for “improper means” to support an intentional interference claim.4 
However, the Members proved no such improper intent to breach the License Agreement. 
Thus, the tort claim of intentional interference was dismissed with prejudice.  
                                                 
4 At trial, the Members’ counsel argued at length that Gold’s Gym’s knowing breach of 
contract constituted improper means for purposes of tortious interference. Mr. Nadesan 
argued that “[t]he improper means in terms of Gold’s [Gym] would be doing it contrary 
to their contract, contrary to any obligation to make sure they’re dealing with an 
authorized party.” (R., pp.5111-5216; Trial Transcript, 3 November 2016, 15:21-24) 
(emphasis added). The court even specifically asked whether the improper means to 
support an intentional interference claim was “either conversion or breach of contract?” 
(Id. at 18:19-25) (emphasis added). The Members’ counsel responded, “Correct.” (Id.) 
(emphasis added).  
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In Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 18, 338 P.3d 825, 830, the 
Utah Court of Appeals analyzed a similar fee provision in a non-compete agreement, 
which provided: “If any legal action arises under this agreement or relating thereto, ... 
[t]he prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees....” The 
Giles court determined whether defendants’ tort counterclaim, i.e. breach of fiduciary 
duty, arose out of or related to the non-compete agreement, and if so, to award attorneys’ 
fees to the prevailing party. Giles, 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 19, 338 P.3d at 830. The trial 
court rejected the argument that the tort claim was unrelated or did not arise out of the 
contract claim, and awarded attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party on the tort claim. Id. 
Affirming on appeal, and because the same facts that supported the contract claim were 
incorporated for the tort claim, the court concluded that “the Contract Claim and the 
Fiduciary Duty Claim were filed together as a “legal action aris[ing] under” the 
agreements “or relating thereto” and that, as the prevailing party in the action, Giles was 
entitled to an award of attorney fees.” Giles, 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 22, 338 P.3d at 831 
(emphasis added); see also Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ¶ 21, 
993 P.2d 222, 227 (affirming a trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees on the basis that the 
“contract and torts claims were based on related legal theories involving a common core 
of facts.”); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (“Because these 
complex issues were so intertwined, we find the court acted within its discretion in its 
award of attorney fees”); Durant v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 
(10th Cir. 1993) (stating because plaintiff’s “claims arose out of a common core of facts 
and involved related legal theories, the district court may ... conclude her prevailing party 
status on ... [one] claim subsumes her failure to succeed [on the other.]”); Dejavue, Inc., 
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1999 UT App 355, ¶ 20, 993 P.2d at 227 (“when a plaintiff brings multiple claims 
involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and [the defendant] prevails 
on at least some of its claims, [the defendant] is entitled to compensation for all attorney 
fees reasonably incurred in the litigation.”). 
As in Giles to support Members’ relied on a breach of contract claim into their 
intentional interference claim. Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an award of 
attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party with respect to the Members’ 
intentional interference claim that arises out of and relates to the License Agreement. 
2. Conversion of Contractual Franchise Rights. The Members’ conversion 
claim is inherently “related to” and “arises from” the License Agreement. The Members 
have asserted that Gold’s Gym converted their franchise rights under the License 
Agreement, and that Gold’s Gym converted the property and equipment located at the St. 
George gym that were allegedly the Members’ property pursuant to the License 
Agreement. In their opposition memorandum to a summary judgment motion filed by 
Gold’s Gym, the Members stated:    
Gold’s clearly exercised control over the License Agreement and 
subsequently over the Franchise Agreement. Engle had to seek the 
permission of Gold’s to enter into a Franchise Agreement on behalf of 
Fitcorp, and Gold’s not only granted such permission … but it also 
unilaterally and on its own accord terminated the License Agreement and 
replaced it with Fitcorp’s Franchise Agreement. Gold’s also exercised 
control inconsistent with the Members’ rights when it not only consented to 
the transfer of the Franchise Agreement from Fitcorp to Fitness Source, 
but refused to relinquish its control and return the license/franchise rights 
to the Members when they notified Gold’s of their rightful ownership... 
Gold’s further exercised control over the franchise inconsistent with the 
Members’ rights when it terminated Fitness Source, LLC’s Franchise 
Agreement … and, rather than returning the franchise to the Members, 
awarded the franchise rights to St. George Fitness, LLC…. (R., pp.2543-
2651; 5 August 2015 Members’ Corrected Motion to Strike, or In the 
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Alternative, Memorandum in Opposition to Gold’s Gym’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p.31-32) (emphasis added). 
 
The Members’ arguments below in effort to establish a conversion claim relate to and 
arise directly from the License Agreement.5 The trial court additionally held:  
Also, the [franchise/license] rights ceased to exist when the License 
Agreement was changed to a Franchise Agreement. Lastly, even if these 
rights were somehow capable of being converted, their value at the time of 
the alleged conversion would be something less than the $8,500 HSSG paid 
for them when it entered the License Agreement. (R., pp.3631-3665; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.27) (emphasis added).   
 
In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 22, 978 P.2d 470, 475, 
although a conversion claim was not at issue, the case entailed a “common factual basis 
with his breach of warranty and his negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims.” 
“Richards’s defense to Brown’s contract claim was that Brown had misrepresented the 
value of the company and had breached warranties under the contract and thus had failed 
to substantially perform.” Id. at ¶ 22, 978 P.2d at 475. The court held that the “fees were 
recoverable” when the defendants’ attorneys’ efforts “went to prove facts common to 
both [claims].” Id. (alteration in original). 
In this case, as in Brown, the Members’ tort claim for conversion is essentially a 
breach of contract claim. The Members’ assert that Gold’s Gym breached the License 
Agreement by not obtaining the Members’ written consent for an assignment of the 
franchise rights thereunder, which is the same basis for their conversion claim. 
Significantly, the franchise rights the Members claim were converted were created by the 
                                                 
5 During closing arguments, the Members’ counsel argued that their conversion claim 
was dependent upon the License Agreement: “Instead what it did was it entered into an 
agreement where it replaced the old license agreement with a new franchise 
agreement. That is where the conversion happened.” (R., pp.5111-5216; Trial 
Transcript, 3 November 2016, 8:2-4 (emphasis added). 
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License Agreement. The Members provide no additional evidence to support their 
conversion claim besides what was presented to establish their tortious interference or 
breach of contract claims. The Members present a common core of facts and legal 
theories to support multiple causes of actions, including the claim for conversion, all of 
which arise from and relate to the License Agreement. Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled 
to an award of attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party with respect to 
the Members’ conversion claim. 
3. Conspiracy to Convert or Intentionally Interfere With Contractual 
Franchise Rights. A conspiracy can only be proven based upon an underlying tort, see 
Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ¶ 13 (Utah Ct.App. 2012) (citation omitted), and 
thus, it logically follows that the Members’ conspiracy claim arises out of and relates to 
the License Agreement because the Members’ other tort claims do so as well. The trial 
court held the following with respect to the Members’ conspiracy claim: 
For there to be a meeting of the minds on an unlawful objective, the 
Members would have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Gold’s Gym was aware of Engle’s plan to surreptitiously eliminate the 
Members’ ownership in the St. George gym through the device of 
converting the License Agreement to a Franchise Agreement, and in so 
doing change the franchise from HSSG, an entity in which the Members 
had a membership interest, to Fitcorp, an entity in which they do not have 
an interest…Showing that Gold’s Gym failed to follow its usual 
procedures, was careless in not investigating the matter further, or even that 
it breached the License Agreement by not verifying the accuracy of the 
statement – even if that were true, and the court does not find it is – would 
not be sufficient. (R., pp.3631-3665; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, pp.23-24) (emphasis added). 
 
The trial court not only addressed conspiracy as it relates to the License Agreement but 
again stated that the Members’ theory of conversion arises out of breach of the License 
Agreement.  
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In Keith Jorgensen’s, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, ¶ 25, 26 
P.3d 872, 879, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a conspiracy claim and an award of 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party pursuant to a fee provision that required 
reimbursement of fees and costs for “any action or proceeding against the other relating 
to the provisions of this Lease….” On appeal, the plaintiff argued that “the trial court 
improperly awarded attorney fees to Mall Defendants for successfully defending against 
his conspiracy to defraud claims because, as tort claims, they do not relate to the leases.” 
Id. at ¶ 27, 26 P.3d at 879 (emphasis added). Upholding the trial court’s award of 
attorneys’ fees, the Keith court held: 
[T]he conspiracy to defraud and breach of lease claims significantly 
overlapped. Jorgensen’s Third Amended Complaint incorporated the 
same seventy-six background facts to support the breach of lease and 
conspiracy to defraud claims. The claims also relied on similar theories. 
Additionally, Mall Defendants used the same facts and discovery, 
depositions in particular, to defend against these claims. Accordingly, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in awarding attorney fees to Mall 
Defendants for successfully defending against the conspiracy to defraud 
claims. Id. at ¶ 28, 26 P.3d at 879 (emphasis added). 
In the present matter, the Members’ conspiracy claim arises out of and relates to 
their claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, and conversion. Each of the 
Members’ claims entails a common core of facts and legal theories arising out of alleged 
breach of the License Agreement. Gold’s Gym was compelled to assert the same facts 
and legal theories to defend against these claims. Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an 
award of attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party with respect to the 
Members’ conspiracy claim that arises out of and relates to the License Agreement. 
E. Gold’s Gym Prevailed On the Discovery-Related Motions. The Members 
did not contest before the trial court that Gold’s Gym prevailed on all but one discovery-
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related motions.6 First, on 14 February 2013, Judge Toomey denied both the Members’ 
Statement of Discovery Issues and Motion for Enlargement of Time because, among 
other things, the Members did not exhaust their standard discovery for a Tier III case. (R., 
p.579-582; 14 February 2013 Memorandum Decision, p.2). Subsequently, on 6 
September 2013, the court denied the Members’ Motion for Reconsideration of the 
court’s prior 14 February 2013 Order. (R., pp.1427-1449; 6 September 2013 
Memorandum Decision, pp.4-9).    
Next, on 19 June 2015, the court denied the Members’ third attempt to extend fact 
discovery. (R., pp.2204-2207). In this 19 June 2015 Order, the court also denied the 
Members’ request to compel Gold’s Gym to provide any additional documents besides 
the re-constituted financial statements for 2006 and 2010, which the Members did not 
even use or present at trial because they were irrelevant – the ground upon which Gold’s 
Gym objected to the production of these documents in the first place. (Id.). The court 
denied the Members’ remaining discovery issues at that time. (Id.). In addition, the Order 
from the court on 20 July 2015 again denied the Members’ discovery motion to clarify 
the court’s prior 19 June 2015 Order. (R., pp.2467-2469). 
On 9 November 2015, the court granted Gold’s Gym Motion to Strike the 
Members’ Expert Witness Designation as being grossly untimely since expert discovery 
had expired years earlier. (R., pp.2805-2807). The Members then filed a Motion for Jury 
Trial, which the court denied on 10 December 2015 because it found that the Members 
                                                 
6 Gold’s did not prevail on one (1) discovery-related motion and has not included fees for 
that motion herein.  
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had waived their right to a jury trial by failing to pay the requisite filing fee even after the 
court reminded the Members of their failure to do so. (R., pp.2848-2850).  
Due to the Members’ dilatory conduct throughout this entire action to properly 
prosecute its case-in-chief, Gold’s Gym was forced to respond to discovery motions that 
were filed even after the fact and expert discovery deadlines had expired by several years. 
The Members’ discovery motions were not even close calls due to the egregious failure 
of the Members to abide by the discovery deadlines or to exhaust the discovery 
guidelines before requesting judicial intervention. Gold’s Gym prevailed on practically 
all of the discovery motions during this action. 
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $82,792.74 in attorneys’ fees and costs with respect 
to the identified discovery motions in this case. (R., 3870-3960; Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, 
¶ 23). This amount includes analyzing the Members’ discovery motions and researching 
and drafting responses thereto, drafting Gold’s Gym’s discovery motion, and analyzing 
the documents and data disclosed therefrom. This figure also includes drafting discovery 
requests to the Members and writing responses to the Members’ discovery requests, 
which all relate to and arise out of the License Agreement. Gold’s Gym has also 
calculated the time and expense incurred in phone conferences with opposing counsel to 
meet and confer concerning the discovery disputes and other consultations with clients. 
This amount also encompasses the time and expense to prepare for and attend the 
conferences held by the court. This figure includes the time and expense incurred in 
drafting the respective discovery orders per the court’s rulings and requests. Finally, this 
amount includes mediation efforts that occurred throughout discovery and prior to trial in 
this case. Therefore, Gold’s Gym seeks an Order from this Court in the above-stated 
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amount as part of its award for reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing in the discovery 
issues. 
F. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees for its Summary Judgment 
Motions. The attorneys’ fees related to Gold’s Gym’s summary judgment motions was 
contested at trial court. The Members specifically cited to Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley 
Corp., 2010 UT App 361, ¶ 52, 246 P.3d 131 (explaining that parties cannot recover 
attorney fees incurred in prosecuting unsuccessful motions for summary judgment), and 
stated that Gold’s Gym incurred $146,795.50 in fees on unsuccessful motions for 
summary judgment, and that at most, it could be awarded only $220,525.03 in attorneys’ 
fees of the total $367,320.50 it sought at the time (not including attorneys’ incurred in the 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on with respect to this appeal). (R., pp.4054-4067; Members’ 
Memo. in Opp. to Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, p.2).    
However, in Deer Crest Assocs. I, L.C. v. Deer Crest Resort Grp., No. 2:04-CV-
220 TS, 2007 WL 3143691, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2007) (emphasis added), the Utah 
federal court held the following when awarding $279,726.00 of attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party:  
Plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion was related to the claims on which it 
eventually prevailed. Particularly in the context of a failed motion for 
summary judgment, in which fact development is critical, a subsequent 
success is possible after material issues of fact are resolved. Plaintiff 
ultimately achieved the goals of this lawsuit and, therefore, attorneys’ 
fees for the partial summary judgment motion are appropriately included 
in the total fee.  
 
In this case, as in Deer Crest, Gold’s Gym’s motions for summary judgment were 
essential to prepare for trial and resolve outstanding issues related to the Members’ 
claims. Although Gold’s Gym did not prevail on all of its summary judgment motions the 
Page 23 of 40 
 
work done to prepare for summary judgment would have had to be done to prepare for 
trial and thus saved additional fees that otherwise would have been incurred in preparing 
for trial. For example, at trial Gold’s Gym relied on the previously filed motions to 
demonstrate the Members’ lack of disclosure of a damages calculation as required by 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in addition to the lack of evidence to 
support the Members’ damages for lost profits, as was the case in Stevens-Henager Coll. 
v. Eagle Gate Coll., Provo Coll., Jana Miller, 2011 UT App 37, ¶ 35, 248 P.3d 1025, 
1035, and in Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain W. Title, 2016 UT App 62, ¶ 17, 370 P.3d 
963, 968, both of which were cited in the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R., pp.3631-3665; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp.31-32).  
Similarly, Gold’s Gym argued at the summary judgment stage that it was entitled 
to judgment because it had no intent to conspire with Defendant Engle to deprive the 
Members of anything, nor could this be proven with clear and convincing evidence, with 
which the court ultimately held after hearing all of the trial evidence. (Id. at pp.23-24). 
Gold’s Gym also argued at summary judgment that it was never in control or possession 
of the franchise property. The court agreed with Gold’s Gym again on this point. (Id. at 
pp.26-27). Gold’s Gym previously argued that a mere approval of an assignment or 
transfer of a franchise cannot constitute conversion, and the court found that such action 
does not amount to exercising control over membership contracts owned by the 
franchisee. (Id. at p.28). In addition, Gold’s Gym argued that the Members’ intentional 
interference claim fails as a matter of law because Gold’s Gym cannot interfere with its 
own License Agreement, that Gold’s Gym did not have the requisite intent to interfere 
with the Members, and nor did Gold’s Gym intentionally breach the contract, which 
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would support the improper means prong of an intentional interference claim. All of these 
same arguments would have had to be briefed and prepared and the same costs required 
to prepare for summary judgment would have been uncured preparing for trial in this 
matter regarding the arguments that the court relied on for its rulings. (Id. at pp.29-30).     
Gold’s Gym’s summary judgment motions were advantageous because it 
produced important evidence, tested the parties’ theories, and revealed facts and issues 
that were previously unnoticed. Further, the court’s 6 September 2013 findings set forth 
strong connections between Gold’s Gym’s motions for summary judgment and Gold’s 
Gym’s ultimate success in this case. For example, the court noted that “The Members 
should have designated an expert within the specified discovery deadlines, and the 
Members have been dilatory in providing even a ballpark figure for its damages 
estimate.” (R., pp.1427-1449; 6 September 2013 Memorandum Decision, p.17). Finally, 
after all of the evidence was presented at trial, the court accepted Gold’s Gym’s 
arguments that were raised in its summary judgment motions and dismissed the 
Members’ claims altogether. 
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $146,857.76 in attorneys’ fees and costs with 
respect to the summary judgment motions in this case. (R., 3870-3960; Decl. of Blake T. 
Ostler, ¶ 25). This amount includes time and expenses for drafting the motions, analyzing 
the Members’ responses thereto, preparing the reply memoranda in support thereof, 
conferring with clients, arguing the motions before the court, and submitting the 
respective orders per the court’s ruling and request. 
G. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys’ For All Claims 
Successfully Defended At Trial, Including Pre-Trial and Post-Trial Motions. The 
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Members did not contest Gold’s Gym entire fees for pre- trial and post-trial motions in 
the lower court. “Where a contract provides the right to attorney fees, Utah courts have 
allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the 
fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful.” Occidental/Nebraska 
Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Because Gold’s Gym 
successfully defended each and every claim the Members brought against it, Gold’s Gym 
is entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees attributable to the claims that were tried to the 
bench and upon which Gold’s Gym prevailed, including pre-trial and post-trial motions.   
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $123,993.61 in attorneys’ fees and costs with 
respect to trial. (R., pp. 3870-3960; Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 27). This amount includes 
time and expenses for pre-trial motions, pre-trial disclosures and respective objections 
thereto, preparing the exhibits and witnesses, analyzing case strategy and Utah law 
relevant to the Members’ claims, and spending three (3) days in trial before the court. 
This amount includes the legal work involved with the Members’ pre-trial motions dated 
9 November 2015 – Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Strike the Members’ Expert Witness 
Designation, which was granted in favor of Gold’s Gym; and 22 December 2015 – the 
Members’ Motion For Jury Trial, which was denied in favor of Gold’s Gym. This amount 
also includes the time spent preparing the court-requested post-trial brief relating to 
intentional breach of contract as a basis to support the improper means element of a 
tortious interference claim, which was filed by both parties on 14 December 2016. This 
figure also includes legal expenses concerning the Members’ post-trial motions dated 19 
December 2016 – the Members’ Motion to Re-Open Evidence and Motion for Sanctions, 
both of which were summarily denied as moot upon the court’s entry of its Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Gold’s Gym. (R., p.3764). Therefore, Gold’s 
Gym is entitled to the above-stated amount as part of its award for reasonable attorneys’ 
fees for prevailing in the pre- and post-trial motions and at trial. 
H. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to an Award for the Time Spent Preparing the 
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The Members did not contest this issue in the 
lower court. In Utah, “[a]ttorneys’ fees are generally awarded for the reasonable time 
spent preparing the subject motion seeking such fees.” Parker v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 987 
F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1237 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 602 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted). In this case, Gold’s Gym has spent a total of $13,721.50 preparing 
this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as of 6 January 2017. (R., 3870-3960; Decl. of 
Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 29). Additional time will be spent analyzing the Members’ response 
hereto, if any, drafting a reply memorandum, as needed, and preparing and attending oral 
arguments should the Court so require. Therefore, Gold’s Gym requests this Court to 
permit Gold’s Gym to supplement its request for attorneys’ fees for the time spent 
preparing and arguing this Motion before this Court.    
I. Gold’s Gym’s Fee Allocation is Reasonable. The Members did not contest 
this issue in the lower court. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated the 
following: “Where a [defendant] has obtained excellent results, his attorney should 
recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably 
expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced 
award may be justified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). “[T]he most 
critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Id. at 436.  
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In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 16, 978 P.2d 470, 474, 
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s capricious reduction of the requested 
fee amount of $540,000 to $218,986.42. The Brown court stated that “the court 
erroneously eliminated fees where the factual development, although necessary to defeat 
Brown’s contract claim, also bore on Richards’s fraud claims.” Id. at ¶ 18, 978 P.2d at 
475 (emphasis added). The trial court also arbitrarily made a “thirty-five percent” 
reduction “of the total time expended through trial [i.e., the approximate time spent on 
the breach of warranty claim]...would be more reasonable.” Id. The trial court was 
reversed because “Richards’s defense under the Asset Sale Agreement (i.e., Richards’s 
defense that Brown failed to substantially perform) had a common factual basis with his 
breach of warranty and his negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. Where 
Richards’s attorneys’ efforts went to prove facts common to both recoverable contract 
and non-recoverable fraud claims, the fees were recoverable.” Id. (emphasis added). 
“There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and fraud evidence such that one 
could not allocate the time expended to one claim or the other with any degree of 
precision.” Id. In the end, the Brown court awarded “reverse[d] and remande[d] for the 
entry of an award to Richards for his trial fees of $540,000.” Id. at ¶ 24, 978 P.2d at 475. 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 
201, ¶ 2, 71 P.3d 188, 192, upheld an award of $432,941.36 in attorney fees. The Kraatz 
court concluded that “Kraatz’s counsel’s fee affidavit and very detailed accompanying 
materials convince us that Kraatz thoroughly accounted for all time spent pursuing his 
respective claims....” Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201, ¶ 58, 71 P.3d at 202. In addition, the 
Kraatz court rejected the arguments raised to reduce the fee amount, viz.: “(1) Kraatz’s 
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counsel spent time researching the trial judge’s reversal rate on appeal in deciding 
whether to appeal in this case; (2) ‘Time spent on travel is not fully compensable’; (3) 
Kraatz’s counsel billed for two or more attorneys’ time spent on the same task; and (4) 
Kraatz’s counsel billed for time spent in attorney conferences.” Id. at ¶ 60, 71 P.3d at 
202. The court responded that “Heritage has not cited any Utah authority suggesting that 
any one of these things should not be recoverable within the trial court’s discretion.” Id.  
The court in Kraatz also emphasized that the fee was appropriate due to the 
duration, difficulty and complexity of the litigation, the overlapping nature of the claims, 
the amount in controversy and the financial analysis accordingly, the discovery taken, the 
experience and expertise of legal counsel, the necessity of involving multiple attorneys in 
the representation, and the overall reasonableness of the fee award. Id. at 202-03. 
Applying the factors discussed in Kraatz establishes that Gold’s Gym’s fee calculation is 
reasonable.  
First, this litigation has been ongoing for over 11 years. Second, this case has 
proven to be complex due to the multiple claims asserted by the Members, the relation of 
the present case to the previously filed case, the lack of witnesses due to death or other 
causes, the unavailability or lack of participation of named parties in this action, the 
difficulty in proving damages in this case, and because of the Members’ repeated failures 
to abide by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly with respect to discovery. 
Third, the Members’ claims overlap significantly, all stemming from a common core of 
facts. Fourth, settlement was almost impossible given the Members’ outrageous 
settlement offers despite their speculative evidence supporting their claims and 
particularly damages. The Members’ asserted at trial that they were entitled to roughly 
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$2,000,000 (i.e. $450,000 plus $100,000 annually from 2002 to the present) (R., pp.5111-
5216; Trial Transcript, 3 November 2016, pp.11, 13), and in their Complaint, they sought 
an additional $1,000,000 in punitive damages. (R., pp.1-151, Complaint, p.50; see also 
R., pp.430-431, Default Judgments Against Defendants Vince Engle, Health Source, Inc., 
and Fitcorp, Inc. wherein Members seek $7,165,032.21 in damages, $3,762,632.21 in 
prejudgment interest, and $20,000,000 in punitive damages to be entered against the 
other Defendants). Although the Members sought astronomical amounts in damages, 
Gold’s Gym prudently rejected the Members’ unreasonable settlement offers given the 
financial analysis and weaknesses of the Members’ case.      
 Fifth, difficulty arose in this case because the Members repeatedly attempted to re-
open fact and expert discovery after cut-off dates, which the lower court rejected on 
several occasions. Sixth, Gold’s Gym lead attorney has over 30 years of litigation and 
trial experience, and this case required an experienced litigator to address the 
complexities and nuances raised by the Members’ Complaint against the several 
Defendants. Seventh, due to the longevity and complexity of this case, Gold’s Gym took 
advantage of involving junior associates to engage in researching, drafting, and analyzing 
this case in addition to having a more experienced attorney for more complex issues, 
strategy, and trial preparation. Finally, as in Kraatz and Brown, Gold’s Gym’s requested 
fee amount is reasonable given the duration, complexity, and overall outcome of this 
case.  
J. Gold’s Gym Seeks Reimbursement of its Attorneys’ Fees Incurred On 
Appeal Pursuant to the License Agreement. For the foregoing reasons, Gold’s Gym 
respectfully requests this Court to grant this appeal by awarding Gold’s Gym its 
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attorneys’ fees incurred in successfully defending this action, consisting of the following: 
(1) $13,676.42 for prevailing on the Members’ breach of contract claim; (2) $82,792.74 
for prevailing on the discovery motions throughout the entire case; (3) $146,857.76 for 
ultimately prevailing on the summary judgment motions; (4) $123,993.61 for prevailing 
on the pre- and post-trial motions and at trial on the Members’ intentional interference, 
conversion, and conspiracy claims, which (1) through (4), supra, totals $367,320.53 of 
attorneys’ fees and costs as of the filing of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, not 
including the fees incurred preparing the entirety of that Motion or this appeal, and (5) 
the right to provide supplemental information based on a fee affidavit from Gold’s Gym’s 
legal counsel with the additional attorneys’ fees incurred for preparing and arguing this 
appeal before this Court. 
K. The Members Asserted a Derivative Action On Behalf Of the Corporation 
Against Gold’s Gym. The claims asserted by the Members are derivative claims because 
they sought to enforce rights belonging to HSSG. The Court must first determine whether 
the Members’ claims against Gold’s Gym are derivative or direct. “The characterization 
of an action as derivative or direct is a question of state law.” Rice v. Deer Crest Janna, 
LLC, No. 2:09-CV-00560, 2010 WL 1329704, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2010); see Combs 
v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 382 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.2004).  
“Utah law defines derivative suits as, those which seek to enforce any right which 
belongs to the corporation. Actions alleging mismanagement, breach of fiduciary 
duties...generally belong to the corporation, and therefore, a shareholder must bring such 
actions on its behalf. Moreover, even though wrongdoing or fraud of corporate officers 
may indirectly injure shareholders, shareholders generally cannot sue directly for those 
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injuries.” Rice, No. 2:09-CV-00560, 2010 WL 1329704, at *9 (citing Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). “In contrast, a direct claim is one where “the injury is one to 
the plaintiff as a stockholder…, and not to the corporation, as where the action is based 
on [a] contract to which he is a party, or on a right belonging severally to him.” Rice, No. 
2:09-CV-00560, 2010 WL 1329704, at *9 (citing GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Management, 
Ltd., 163 P.3d 636, 640 (Utah Ct.App.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “A shareholder may sue in his individual capacity in a direct action when he 
can show that he was injured in a manner distinct from the corporation…Claims brought 
by members of non-profit corporations will be analyzed under the same parameters.” Id. 
(citations omitted). “If a member attempts to bring such a claim individually and not as a 
derivative action, the claim will be dropped.” Id. However, the “shareholder must 
examine his injury in relation to the corporation and demonstrate that the injury was 
visited upon him and not the corporation.” Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (citing Dansie v. City of Herriman, 134 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2006)). “If the 
“[p]laintiffs were injured because the [c]ompany was injured,” the claim is 
derivative.” Id. (citing Dansie, 134 P.3d at 1144). 
In Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 
1998), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a “closely-held” exception to the necessity of 
derivative actions. However, in Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d 
1139, 1145, the Supreme Court of Utah stated the following: “[f]rom our vantage point 
eight years after Aurora, we can see that our proclamation of a ‘growing trend’ in 
recognizing an exception to the derivative action rule for closely-held corporations may 
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have overstated matters. Some jurisdictions have rejected the closely-held corporation 
exception or severely limited it…Since Aurora, we have not had the opportunity to fully 
delineate the bounds of the exception in Utah.” 
Critically, the Aurora court did not address the issue presented here. The Aurora 
decision merely held that members of a closely-held corporation can proceed directly 
against corporate officers. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc., 970 P.2d at 1281. It more 
specifically stated that this exception “would exempt the minority shareholder from many 
of the procedural requirements of a derivative action, such as the requirement to make 
demand on the corporation and to obtain court approval before voluntarily dismissing or 
settling an action.” Id. Thus, the Aurora court created an exception to the derivative 
action procedural rules. It did not alter the nature of the action, namely that a derivative 
action is one that the members bring on behalf of the corporation. Whether the derivative 
action procedure rules are exempted or waived based on a closely-held status of an entity, 
the nature of the action, if derivative, will nonetheless remain derivative. Put simply, 
Aurora did not shift the entire legal framework for analyzing whether a claim is direct or 
derivative, it only created procedural exemptions for members of closely-held 
corporations.   
Accordingly, Gold’s Gym seeks a ruling from this Court that the Members’ claim 
in this case are derivative regardless of whether they satisfy the Aurora closely-held 
exception or whether the Court desires to now depart from the Aurora decision based on 
its later comments in Dansie, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d at 1145, when it stated: “Since 
Aurora, we have not had the opportunity to fully delineate the bounds of the exception in 
Utah.” The Members of HSSG brought a derivative action on behalf of the closely-held 
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LLC against Gold’s Gym. The Members have no direct injury. The Members are not 
parties to the License Agreement. Rather, HSSG is the only party to the License 
Agreement. The contract rights belong to HSSG, not to the individual Members. See 
Rice, No. 2:09-CV-00560, 2010 WL 1329704, at *10 (“The court notes that Ms. Rice is 
not a party to the Master Declaration. Ms Rice’s rights and non-exclusive easements 
under the Master Declaration stem from her status as a property owner. These same rights 
and easements belong to all Deer Crest property owners. Accordingly, the court finds that 
Ms. Rice’s claims are derivative.”); see also Barnes, 783 F.3d at 1195 (“At bottom, most 
of plaintiffs’ claims rest on injuries to the Holding Company that are derivative of 
injuries to the Bank. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that those claims belong to 
the FDIC.”). Therefore, the Members’ claims against Gold’s Gym can only be derivative 
claims. 
The Utah authority allowing shareholders of close corporations to bring direct 
actions is limited and originates from Aurora. The holding in Aurora is narrow, 
subsequently distinguished, and inapplicable to the case at hand. The holding states: 
“[w]e therefore hold that a court may allow a minority shareholder in a closely held 
corporation to proceed directly against corporate officers.” Aurora Credit Servs., Inc., 
970 P.2d at 1281 (emphasis added); see also Banyan Inv. Co., LLC v. Evans, 2012 UT 
App 333, ¶ 19, 292 P.3d 698, 705, writ of certiorari granted in Banyon Inv. v. Evans, 300 
P.3d 312 (Utah 2013) (applying the Aurora exception for a member to bring suit against 
the managers of an LLC). As explained, the Members are pursuing claims against Gold’s 
Gym as a third party, not against managers. The Utah Supreme Court has never 
subsequently sanctioned the exception. The Aurora court reasoned that “ [t]here is a 
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growing trend to allow minority shareholders of a closely held corporation to proceed 
directly against majority shareholders.” Aurora Credit Servs., Inc., 970 P.2d at 1280 
(emphasis added). While Aurora remains the law, the Utah Supreme Court has 
backtracked from the limited holding From our vantage point eight years after Aurora, 
we can see that our proclamation of a ‘growing trend’ in recognizing an exception to the 
derivative action rule for closely held corporations may have overstated matters.” Dansie, 
2006 UT 23 at ¶ 16, 134 P.3d at 1139. The Utah Court of Appeals observed “since its 
decision in Aurora Credit, the Utah Supreme Court has not sanctioned this exception, and 
has recently suggested that the trend to invoke it may have “stopp[ed]  in its tracks” or 
“retreated,” and that it has been “severely limited or rejected” in some jurisdictions.” 
GLFP, Ltd., 2007 UT App 131, 163 P.3d at 643 (citing Dansie, 2006 UT 23 at ¶ 16, 134 
P.3d at 1139). 
  “Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Alaska, and Arkansas each refuse to 
apply the close corporation exception, recognizing instead that an individual shareholder 
can bring a direct action only when a stockholder “shows a violation of duty owed 
directly to him” or when an injury is “peculiar” to him. See, e.g., Crocker v. Federal 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1987) (applying Mississippi law 
and noting that a stockholder may sue directly “‘in a case where the stockholder shows a 
violation of duty owed directly to him’” (quoting Bruno v. Southeastern Servs., 385 
So.2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1980))); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1997)(“[F]or a 
shareholder to maintain an individual action, the shareholder must establish a ‘special 
injury’ which is separate and distinct from that of other shareholders.”); Meyerson v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 233 Neb. 758, 448 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1989) (requiring shareholders 
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to allege a “separate and distinct injury” if bringing an individual action); Donaldson, 
Breathing Life Into Aurora Services, 2002 Utah L. Rev at 531 (discussing states that have 
adopted special injury requirement); cf., e.g., Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 
P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986) (finding that shareholders may assert direct claims for 
breach of contract to which he is a party); Hames v. Cravens, 332 Ark. 437, 966 S.W.2d 
244, 247 (1998) (same).” GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgmt., Ltd., 2007 UT App 131, 163 P.3d 
636, 643. 
In Dansie, 2006 UT 23, ¶ 31, 134 P.3d at 1148 the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
claim by shareholders against third party City of Herriman was a derivative action. 
Herriman was neither an officer nor director of the company. The Dansie court held that 
the claim was therefore a third-party derivative claim. The Dansie court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims because they had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 23A 
URCP regarding derivative actions. The Dansie court stated: “[w]e are unable to uncover 
any behavior by Defendants that was animated by a desire to injure Plaintiffs in their 
individual capacities...[t]o think otherwise is to misunderstand the distinction between 
individual and corporate injury. A shareholder does not sustain an individual injury 
because a corporate act results in disparate treatment among shareholders. Rather, the 
shareholder must examine his injury in relation to the corporation and demonstrate 
that the injury was visited upon him and not the corporation.” Dansie, at ¶¶ 12-13, 134 
P.3d at 1144 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
L. Because the Members Asserted Derivative Claims, the Members Must 
Assume Both the Rights and Obligations Under the License Agreement, Including 
the Obligation to Pay Attorneys’ Fees. “As a general rule, attorney fees are recoverable 
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only if authorized by contract or statute.” Giles, 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d at 829-
30 (citations omitted). A court may also award costs and attorneys’ fees based upon a 
written contract when the provisions of the contract “allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.   
In this case, the License Agreement contemplates the payment of attorneys’ fees in 
several provisions as follows:  
The prevailing party in any dispute relating to or arising out of this 
Agreement, shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses including, 
without limitation, accounting’, attorneys’, arbitrators’, and related fees, 
costs, and other expenses, in addition to any other relief to which such party 
may be entitled. (Ex. A to Addendum, § 4, p.16). 
 
Notwithstanding the contractual language requiring the payment of costs and attorneys’ 
fees in this case, the Members argue that they are not liable to pay such costs and 
attorneys’ fees because they are not “signatories” to the License Agreement. This 
argument holds no water. They initiated this lawsuit. The Members specifically sued 
Gold’s Gym for breach of the License Agreement. All of the Members’ other claims (i.e. 
conversion, tortious interference, and conspiracy) relate to and arise out of the License 
Agreement because they stem from the franchise rights embedded in the License 
Agreement. Moreover, the Personal Guaranty expressly references that the Members can 
be held liable for costs and attorneys’ fees.   
In Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 110, 278 
Cal. Rptr. 758, 768 (Ct. App. 1991), the California Court of Appeals dealt with the 
precise issue at hand, and held that “[i]t would be “extraordinarily inequitable” to deny 
them attorney’s fees because plaintiffs who are not signatories chose to sue on the 
contracts in an action on behalf of the corporation when the corporation would not bring 
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suit itself.” In addition to principles of equity, the Brusso court found that “liabilities for 
fees here are predicated on breach of three contracts.” Id. at 108, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 767.  
First, “[t]he individual warranties on the purchase agreement signed by the 
plaintiffs, individually and not on behalf of the corporation, specifically apply to section 
11, the attorney’s fees section.” .” Id. at 109, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 767. Second, “Section 16 
of the purchase agreement states, “The parties hereto agree that any breach of any term or 
condition of this Agreement shall constitute a material breach of this Agreement.” 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the parties contemplated that a breach of the management 
agreement would be a material breach of the purchase agreement, and also subject to the 
section 11 attorney’s fees provision.” Id. As for third contract at issue, the court noted 
that “the lease also contains its own attorney’s fees provision. The only signatories there 
are the corporation and defendant William E. Clark. However, as we discuss below, the 
Trial court was correct in directing the individual plaintiffs, not the corporation, to pay 
the defendants’ fees.” Id. 
In the present matter, the Members must be liable for Gold’s Gym’s costs and 
attorneys’ fees.  Pursuant to the “substantial benefit” doctrine recognized by Utah the 
Members must pay attorney fees. See LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 2003 UT App 377, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 569, 572 (“The trial court also determined 
that the LeVangers’ derivative action conferred a substantial benefit upon Highland 
Estates and, therefore, that the LeVangers were entitled to $41,327.15 
in attorney fees and costs to be paid by Highland Estates.”).  
However, the Members cannot use litigation as a sword when it is advantageous 
but then utilize it as a shield to avoid fees. Because the Members elected to sue Gold’s 
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Gym on behalf of HSSG, despite the Members not being signatories to the License 
Agreement, the Members assumed all of the risks and obligations thereunder, including 
the obligation to reimburse Gold’s Gym its reasonable attorneys’ fees.  
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - Rule 24(a) (9) U.R.A.P. 
As argued herein at length, Gold’s Gym is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the 
License Agreement for being the prevailing party to this action. 
CONCLUSION – Rule 24(a) (10) U.R.A.P. 
For the a reasons set forth above, Gold’s Gym respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court’s order denying Gold’s Gym the right to attorneys’ fees, and to 
award Gold’s Gym its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred throughout the duration of this 
lawsuit.   
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE – Rule 24(a) (11) U.R.A.P. 
I certify that in compliance with U.R.A.P. 24(a) (11), this brief contains 9,982 
words, excluding the Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and addenda.  I relied on 
my word processor to obtain the count, which is Microsoft Word. I further certify that 
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 
compliance with Utah R. App. P. 27(b). I certify that the information on this form is true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry. 
ADDENDUM– Rule 24(a) (12) U.R.A.P. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of February, 2018.  
       OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON 
       /s/ Blake T. Ostler   
       By:   Blake T. Ostler 
       Attorney for Gold’s Gym  
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